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ABSTRACT 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is appearing as a favorite technology for automated 
identification, which can be widely applied to many applications such as e-passport, supply chain 
management and ticketing. However, researchers have found many security and privacy problems along 
RFID technology. In recent years, many researchers are interested in RFID authentication protocols and 
their security flaws. In this paper, we analyze two of the newest RFID authentication protocols 
whichproposed by Fu et al. and Li et al. from several security viewpoints. We present different attacks 
such as desynchronization attack and privacy analysis over these protocols 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is one of the most important technologies in 
this decade. This technology allows identifying the tagging objectives wirelessly using 
transponders queried by readers through a wireless channel. RFID technology has widely been 
used in applications such as public transportation [1], supply chain management [2], e-passports 
[3], location tracking systems [4] and access control systems[5]. 
There are three main components in a RFID system: tags, readers and a backend server. Each 
tag contains a microchip, antenna and a certain amount of computational and storage 
capabilities. A reader queries tags to obtain tag contents through wireless communications and 
sends this information to the backend server through a secure channel. The backend server is 
composed of a database and some processors [6]. Since the passive tags have low-cost and low 
computational capabilities, there are information leakage and many security flaws in passive 
RFID systems. Inasmuch as the passive tags cannot perform complicated cryptography 
algorithms. The main threats of a RFID system are as following. 
• Tag and reader impersonation: A malicious adversary masquerades as a legitimate tag and 
tries to use system services by means of reader deception. On the other hand, a legitimate 
reader is masqueraded by the attacker and he eventually gets access to the stored secrets of 
tag [7]. 
• Man-in-the middle attack: As tags and readers use the wireless channel to communicate 
each other, so this kind of attack can be occurred. In this situation the attacker intervenes 
between a legal tag and a legitimate reader and exchanges or modifies the authentication 
messages [8]. 
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• Tag tracing and tracking: An adversary traces and tracks legitimate tags from their protocol 
interactions. The notions untraceability, backward untraceability and forward 
untraceabilityare related to this attack [9, 10]. 
• Desynchronization: This is an active attack in which a malicious adversary tries to cause the 
tag and the reader to update inconsistent values and make tag disabled [11]. 
In recent years, many researchers have tried to propose lightweight and secure authentication 
protocols [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24], but unfortunately many 
vulnerabilities have been found in their schemes [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38]. Recently Fu et al. [39] proposed a scalable RFID mutual authentication and Li et al. 
[40] suggested a mutual authentication protocol for RFID communication. In this paper, we 
analyze these protocols and will present three different attacks on FWCFP protocol including 
desynchronization attack, attack on untraceability in two methods and attack on backward 
untraceability. Furthermore, one attack is applied on LWJX protocol which is attack on 
untraceability.  The remainder of this paper is organized as following. Related works are 
studied in section 2.We explain the privacy model for RFID systems in section 3. The FWCFP 
protocol is summarized as section 4. Our attacks on FWCFP protocol are discussed in section 5. 
We explain the LWJX protocol in section 6. The security analysis of the LWJX protocol is in 
section 7 and finally section 8 is assigned to conclusion.The notations in table1 are used 
throughout this paper. 
TABLE 1.THE NOTATIONS 
A malicious adversary 
.  A symmetric encryption function 
H a hash function 
G a hash function 
ID tag identifier 
IDT static ID with 96 bit length 
IDTA an alias with 96 bit length 
K secret value shared by the reader and the tag 
 Secret key only known by the reader 
IDold ID which is used in current communication by the reader after successful authentication 
IDnew ID which will be used in the new communication by the reader after successful authentication 
	
  K which will be used in the new communication by the reader after successful authentication 
  K which is used in current communication by the reader after successful authentication 
T the legitimate tag 
R The legitimate reader and backend server 
Rr random numbers generated by the reader 
Rt random numbers generated by the tag 
randi(i=0, 1, 2) a random number 


 
the item X related to the tag  at time  
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2. RELATED WORKS 
In this section we briefly study some authentication protocols which have been proposed to 
provide secure communications in RFID systems. 
Dimitriou proposed an RFID authentication scheme that uses a challenge-response mechanism 
[39].Since the tag identifier remains constant between two successful sessions, this protocol is 
vulnerable to tracking attacks and tag impersonation attack. 
In [40], a lightweight authentication protocol is proposed by Ohkubo et. Al. This scheme 
provides indistinguishability and forward security characteristics. The scheme is based on a 
hash chain and uses two dissimilar hash functions H and G. This protocol does not provide 
protection against an adversary that tries to de-synchronize the server and the tags, 
consequently resulting in a DoS attack.  
Juels [36] showed that cloning and counterfeiting attacks are applied simply on EPC tags. He 
proposed an unclonable authentication protocol to solve these problems. However, Duc et al. 
[20] have presented some weaknesses related to privacy and information leakage in Juels 
scheme. 
In [41], Karthikeyan and Nesterenko suggested a security protocol without complex 
cryptographic primitives. Only XOR and matrix operations were used in their scheme. Chien 
and Chen [12] showed that this protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks and does not assure the 
untraceability property. 
A mutual authentication protocol under the EPC C-1 G-2 standard was proposed by Chien and 
Chen [12]. They had used simple XOR, CRC and PRNG in their scheme. In [12] each tag needs 
to keep an EPC code and two secret keys ,  . Secret key  is used to tag authentication and 
secret key  is used to reader authentication. Both  and   are updated in each round whereas 
EPC code is permanent. For each tag secret values ,  , 	
, 	
, EPC and DATA are 
stored in database. The protocol is initialed with sending a random number by the reader. As 
a result, the tag replies with (M1, ) where M1=CRC(EPC॥॥)⨁. After receiving the 
tag's response, the database searches for finding the correct tag and its corresponding 
information ({, } or {	
, 	
}). Thenthe database computes 
M2=CRC(EPC॥)⨁ (x= old or new) and sends tag M2. At that point the database updates 
its secret keys as following: =	
, =	
, 	
=PRNG(	
) and 
	
=PRNG(	
). The tag receives M2 and checks whether M2⨁=CRC(EPC॥). If it 
satisfies, the tag authenticates the database and updates  and  the same as with the database, 
else it terminates the protocol. 
Lopez et al. [37] showed some weaknesses of Chien and Chen's protocol including tag and 
reader impersonation and desynchronization attack. They also showed that this protocol does 
not guarantee forward security and it is vulnerable to tracing attack. Han and Kwon [14] also 
presented a desynchronization attack and two tag impersonation attacks on Chien and Chen's 
protocol in new methods. These attacks were mainly based on weak secure properties of CRC. 
3. RFIDUNTRACEABLE PRIVACY MODEL 
Some privacy models have been proposed by researchers to evaluation of RFID protocols [9, 
42, 43, 44]. In [42], Juels and Weis gave a formal definition of the privacy and untraceability 
model. The same definition is described by Ouafi and Phan in their work presented in 
ISPEC’08 [44] and we will use this model to analyze the SRP protocol. The model that has 
been described in [44] is summarized as follows. 
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The protocol parties are tags (T) and readers (R) which interact in protocol sessions. In this 
model an adversaryAcontrols the communication channel between all parties by interacting 
either passively or actively with them. The adversaryAis allowed to run the following queries:  
Execute (R, T, i) query. This query models the passive attacks. The adversary A eavesdrops 
on the communication channel between T and R and gets read access to the exchanged 
messages between the parties in session i of a truthful protocol execution. 
Send (U, V, m, i) query. This query models activeattacks by allowing the adversary Ato 
impersonate some reader U ∈R(respectively tag V∈T) in some protocol session iand send 
a message mof its choice to an instance of some tag V ∈T(respectively reader U ∈R ). 
Furthermore the adversary A is allowed to block or alert the message m that is sent from U 
to V (respectively V to U) in session i of a truthful protocol execution. 
Corrupt(T, ) query. This query allows the adversaryA to learn the stored secretK of the 
tagT∈T, and which further sets the stored secret to . Corrupt query means that the 
adversary has physical access to the tag, i.e., the adversary can read and tamper with the 
tag’s permanent memory. 
• Test (i, To, T1) query. This query does not correspond to any of A’s abilities, but it is 
necessary to define the untraceability test. When this query is invoked for sessioni, a random 
bit b∈{0, 1} is generated and then, A is givenTb ∈ {To, T1). Informally, Awins if he can 
guess the bit b.  
Untraceable privacy (UPriv) is defined using the game g played between an adversary A and 
a collection of the reader and the tag instances. The game gisdivided into three following 
phases: 
Learning phase:A is given tags To and T1 randomly and he is able to send any Execute, Send 
and Corrupt queries of its choice to T0, T1 and reader.  
Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tags T0, T1 to be tested and sends a Test (i, To, T1) 
query.  Depending on a randomly chosen bit b ∈ {0, 1}, A is given a tag Tb from the set {T0, 
T1}.Acontinues making any Execute, and Send queries at will. 
Guess phase: finally, A terminates the game g and outputs a bit b' ∈{0, 1}, which is its guess 
of the value of b.  
The success ofAin winning gamegand thus breaking the notion ofUPrivis quantified in terms 
Aadvantage in distinguishing whetherAreceivedT0 or T1 and denoted by    !"#$  (k) where 
k is the security parameter.  
  !"#$  (k) =| pr (b = %΄ – pr (random flip coin) |= | pr (b' = b) - '( |   where 
   0)   !"#$  (k) ≤ '(. 
4. FWCFPPROTOCOL  
Fu et al. proposed a RFID private mutual authentication in [45]. We summarize the proposed 
protocol as follows. IDT and K are static ID and key with 96 bit length which are shared 
between each tag and the reader. Each tag also has an IDTA which is an alias with 96 bit 
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length. The reader has a symmetric encryption function *(.) with secret key  which is 
known only by it. The reader uses *(.) to encrypt and decrypt IDTA. In each execution of 
protocol, IDTA is updated as IDTA = *(IDT || rand0) where rand0 is a random number 
generated by the reader. The steps of the proposed protocol are as following. 
 
 
'.                    +,	'                                  -......................./ 
(.         012,45 ॥+,	',+,	(     6.......................7 
8.              9॥+,	(,: ,;                  -......................./ 
<.                           =                                   6........................7 
 
Figure 1. THE FWCFP PROTOCOL 
1) The reader generates a random number rand1, and sends it to the tag. 
2) The reader generates a random number rand1, and sends it to the tag. 
3) The tag generates a random number rand2,computes H(K || rand1) and sends {IDTA, H(K || 
rand1),rand2} to the reader. H (.) is a secure hash function. 
4) The reader decrypts IDTA using the secret key >to get the permanent ID of tag-IDT, and 
then retrieves the shared key K between the tag and the reader by IDT. It computes H (K || 
rand1) and checks whether the computed value equals to the received one. If it matches, the 
tag is authenticated, otherwise the authentication has failed. If the tag is authenticated 
successfully, the reader generates a new random number rand0, computes IDTA as: 
  
                                   IDTA = *(IDT || rand0)                                                   (1) 
 
Then the reader computes the values A and B as: 
 
                                 A = IDTAA⊕H(K || rand 1 || rand 2)                                        (2) 
 
                                 B = IDTAA⊕H(K || rand2 || rand1)                                          (3) 
 
It also computes H (K || rand2) and sends (H (K || rand2), A, B) to the tag. 
5) The tag checks H(K || rand2) to authenticate the reader. If it matches, the reader is 
authenticated; otherwise the whole authentication has failed. If the reader is authenticated 
successfully, the tag computes H(K || rand 1 || rand 2) and H(K || rand 2 || rand1). Then it 
computes two new aliases as: 
 
                              IDTA1= A ⊕H(K || rand1 || rand2)                                       (4) 
 
                              IDTA2 = B⊕H(K || rand2 || rand1)                                        (5) 
 
If IDTA1= IDTA2, the tag stores IDTA1 as the new alias IDTA and sends OK to the reader. 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE FWCFP PROTOCOL 
In this section, we analyze the FWCFP protocol [45] from the security point of view. We have 
found many security vulnerabilities in this protocol,so we present four different attacks on 
synchronization and untraceability of this protocol. 
Tag 
(IDTA, IDT, 
K) 
 
Reader      
(IDT, K) 
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5.1 Attack on Synchronization 
 
We have found a fundamental weakness in this protocol. An attacker can exploit from this 
weakness and desynchronize a legal tag Ti and the legitimate reader. The procedure of the 
attack is as following.  
1) The adversary eavesdrops a valid session between the legal tag Ti and the reader. He lets 
parties send the first and the second message safely, but he changes the third message and 
modifies the values A, B to AA, C as: 
AA = A ⊕ IDTA ̋                                                                     6 
 
C = B ⊕ IDTA ̋                                                                     7 
 
where IDTA is an arbitrary bit string with 96 bit length. Then the adversary sends (A', B', 
H(K || rand2)) to Ti  as the third message. 
2) Upon receiving the third message,Ticomputes H(K || rand2), checks whether the computed 
value equals to the received one. Because it matches, Ti authenticates the adversary and 
computes IDTA1, IDTA2 as: 
 
IDTA1 = A A⊕ H (K || rand 1 || rand 2) = A ⊕ IDTA ̋⊕H (K || rand 1 || rand2) = IDTA A⊕H(K 
||rand1||rand2)⊕IDTA ̋⊕H(K||rand1||rand2)=IDTAA⊕IDTA ̋ 
(8) 
IDTA2 = B'⊕H(K || rand 2 || rand 1) = B ⊕ IDTA ̋⊕H( K || rand 2 || rand1)=IDTAA⊕H(K || 
rand2||rand1)⊕IDTA ̋⊕H(K||rand2||rand1)=IDTA A⊕IDTA̋ 
(9) 
 
Because IDTA1 = IDTA2, Ti updates the stored IDTA as:  
 
IDTA = IDTA1 = IDTA A⊕IDTA̋                                       (10)     
 
At the next sessions, whenever Tiwants to authenticate itself to the reader, it sends 
IDTA⊕IDTA to the reader. After decryptionIDTA⊕ IDTA, the reader extracts IDT' 
which is not equal to IDT, so the reader does not find IDT' in its database, therefore the reader 
always rejects Ti and they have no way to resynchronization. 
 
5.2 Attack on Untraceability 
 
A main weakness in designing this protocol is the fact that the term H (shared key || a random 
number) has the same structure in the second and the third flow of the protocol. An adversary 
can exploit this weakness and trace a tag as following. 
Learning phase:The adversary is given tag T0 at random. A eavesdrops a perfect session 
between T0 and a legitimate reader. He gets the values rand2 and H (K0 || rand2) from the first 
and the second flows of the protocol respectively by an Execute query. He reserves these 
values. 
Challenge phase: A is giventagTb ∈{T0, T1} randomly. He starts a new session with Tb and 
sends rand2 to it as the first message by Send query. Tbresponds with: 
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(H (Kb || rand2), IDTA, rand'2) and the adversary reserves H (Kb || rand2). 
Guess phase: If H (Kb || rand2) = H (K0 || rand2), the adversary outputs %= 0 and guesses T0, 
otherwise he outputs %=1 and guesses T1. The advantage of the adversary is: 
GHIG
JKLMIN O | QRS TUVW X QRRYVZ[\ ][UV ^_UQ| O `QR % O b X '(` O `1 X 2
d	 X
'
(` O  
'
(  X 2
d	 
  Where |H(.)|=n                                                                                                (11) 
 
By having H (K0 || rand2), if Tb=T0, then with the probability of 1 we have H (Kb || rand2) = 
H(K0 || rand2), but if Tb=T1, then with the probability of 2d	 we have H (Kb || rand2) = H (K0 || 
rand2), because H (.) is a bit string with length n. 
 
5.3 Attack on Backward Untraceability 
 We use the notion backward untraceability from [8] and use the privacy model from [44] to 
show that the FWCFP protocol doesn't assure the backward untraceability. 
Learning phase: A is given tag T0 at random, he sends T0  Corrupt query at time t1 and gets 
the secrets of the T0 at time t1 as ( e', fge', fgSe'. 
Challenge phase:The adversary is given Tb ∈{T0, T1} randomly. He can have access to the 
previous session accomplished between Tb and Rat time t0 < t1. He gets rand1 and H (Kb || 
rand1) by Execute query. 
Guess phase: Because the secret key of T0 is fixed, we have e'= ee. The adversary also has 
rand1 from the session accomplished at time t0. So he can compute H(K0 || rand1). Now, if 
H(Kb || rand1) = H(K0 || rand1), he outputs %=0 and guesses T0, otherwise he outputs %=1 and 
guesses T1. The advantage of the adversary is: 
GHIG
JKLMIN O | QR S TUVW X  QR RYVZ[\ ][UV ^_UQ| O `QR % O b X '(` O
`1 X 2d	 X '(` O  
'
(  X 2
d	 Where|H(.)| = n                                                                           (12) 
 
Because the adversary can compute H(K0 || rand1), he owns this value. By having H (K0 || 
rand1), if Tb=T0, then with the probability of 1 we have H (Kb || rand1) = H (K0 || rand1), but if 
Tb=T1, then with the probability of 2d	 we have H (Kb || rand1) = H (K0 || rand1), because H (.) 
is a bit string with length n. 
 
6. LWJX PROTOCOL 
 Li et al. proposed an authentication protocol for secure RFID communication [46]. The 
proposed protocol is as it follows.Each tag stores an initial ID and a secret key K shared by the 
tag and the reader. The reader keeps the following information for each tag: ID with initial 
value same as to tag's ID, hash value of IDnew with the initial value of H (ID), hash value ofIDold 
with the initial value is empty, new value of secret key Knew with the initial value of K, old 
value of secret key Kold with the initial value is empty. The parameter M holds howmany times 
a tag has had unsuccessful sessions. Two hash functions H and G are implemented on each tag 
and on the reader. The procedure of authentication is as follows.Each tag stores an initial ID 
and a secret key K shared by the tag and the reader. The reader keeps the following information 
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for each tag: ID with initial value same as to tag's ID, hash value of IDnew with the initial value 
of H (ID), hash value ofIDold with the initial value is empty, new value of secret key Knew with 
the initial value of K, old value of secret key Kold with the initial value is empty.The parameter 
M holds howmany times a tag has had unsuccessful sessions. Two hash functions H and G are 
implemented on each tag and on the reader. The procedure of authentication is as follows. 
 
 
 
'.            hi
+j,   +                               -......................./ 
(.         901,   9|| kl,   km            6.......................7 
8.               9 n || o-............./ 
 
 
 
Figure 2. THE LWJX PROTOCOL 
 
1) The reader generates a number Rr at random and sends it to the tag.  
2) After receiving Rr, the tag generates a number Rt at random, computes H (ID) and H (K || 
Rr), then it sends them and Rt to the reader. 
3) The reader searches in the database records tofind whether there is a H (IDold), H (IDnew) 
equal to the received H (ID). Three possible cases occur: 
a) If no value is found, it terminates the protocol. 
b) If it is found that H(IDnew) = H (ID), then the readercomputes H (Knew || Rr) and 
compares it with the received H (K||Rr), if H (Knew ||Rr)p H (K||Rr), then R terminates 
the protocol; otherwise,Rresets M=0, computes H (Knew || Rt) and sends H (Knew || Rt) to 
the tag. Finally, the reader updates its secret values as following:  
 
ID = G (ID)                                                          (13) 
 
H(IDold)=H(IDnew)                                                (14) 
 
H(IDnew)=H(ID)                                                    (15) 
 
Kold=Knew                                                              (16) 
 
Knew =ID⊕Rr⊕Rt                                               (17) 
 
c) If H(IDold) = H(ID) , first the reader checks M,if M isgreater than the upper limit, it 
terminates the protocol and issues a warning;  otherwise it makes M= m+1, now if 
H(Kold ||Rr)p H(K||Rr), then R terminates the communication; otherwise,Rcomputes 
H(Kold|| Rt) and sends H(Kold|| Rt) to the tag. The reader doesn’t update in this case. 
4)  After receiving H (Kx||Rt) {x=old or new}, ifH (Kx||Rt)=H (K||Rt), the tagupdates its 
secretvalues as: 
 
ID=G(ID)                                                           (18) 
 
K=ID ⊕Rr⊕Rt                                                  (19) 
 
7. PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF LWJX PROTOCOL 
In this section, we analyze the LWJX protocol and give an attack on this protocol. 
 
Reader 
{H(IDold), 
H(IDnew), 
Kold,Knew, 
ID, M} 
 
Tag 
(ID, K) 
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7.1 Attack on Untraceability 
 
We give our privacy analysis on LWJX protocol according to the privacy model discussed in 
[18] which has been explained it in section III. We show that the LWJX protocol does not have 
untraceability. 
Learning phase: The adversary is given tag T0at random. He masquerades as a legitimate 
reader and starts a new session with tag T0 by sending Send query. He sends Rr1 to T0 and gets 
its response as (H (fge), H (K0 || Rr1), Rt). The adversary reserves these values and terminates 
the session to avoid the T0 updating. 
Challenge phase:A is given Tb ∈{T0, T1} randomly. The adversary performs a new session 
with Tb by sending Send query. He sends Rr1 to Tband gets its response as (H(fgq), H(Kb || 
Rr1),r). The adversary reserves these values and terminates the session. 
Guess phase: The adversary can guess the correct tag in two ways: 
If H(IDb)= H(ID0) , then the adversary outputs b=0 and guesses T0; otherwise he outputs b=1 
and guesses T1. 
1) If H(Kb || Rr1) = H (K0 || Rr1) , then the adversary outputs b=0 and guesses T0, otherwise he 
outputs b=1 and guesses T1. In both cases, A wins with high probability: 
 
GHIG
JKLMIk O | QR S TUVW X  QR RYVZ[\ ][UV ^_UQ|  O `QR % O b X '(` O
 `1 X 2d	 X '(` O  
'
(  X 2
d	Where |H (.)| = n                                                                       (20) 
 
Because |H(.)| = n, we have H(ID0)=H(ID1)  with the probability of 2d	, so the adversary can 
guess the correct tag with the probability of 1 X  2d	. 
8. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we showed some security and privacy vulnerabilities of the RFID authentication 
protocols proposed by Fu et al [45] and Li et al [46]. We also present the desynchronization 
attack and tag tracing on [45]. In desynchronization attack, an adversary can easily change the 
third message transmitted in protocol and desynchronize the target tag and the legitimate 
reader. We also presented the privacy analysis of this protocol in a formal privacy model. We 
showed the FWCFP protocol doesn't assure untraceability, backward untraceability and 
forward untraceability. We also presented some attacks on privacy and anonymity of [46]. It 
has shown that untraceability and forward untraceability aren’t assured by this protocol.  
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